DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 453 141 SO 032 803

AUTHOR Cheung, Kwok Wah
TITLE The Emergence of Regulated Individualism: Case Study of an Educational Journal in China.
PUB DATE 2001-03-15
NOTE 26p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society (45th, Washington, DC, March 14-17, 2001).
PUB TYPE Reports - Research (143) -- Speeches/Meeting Papers (150)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Academic Discourse; Cultural Context; Educational Change; Educational Theories; Ethical Instruction; Foreign Countries; *Ideology; *Scholarly Communication; *Scholarship
IDENTIFIERS Bernstein (Basil); *China; Cultural Revolution (China); *Educational Journals; Empirical Analysis; Empirical Research

ABSTRACT

Based on the theory of pedagogic discourse developed by Basil Bernstein, this paper discusses the relationship between the production of intellectual discourse and the Chinese State which emerged after the Cultural Revolution. The paper identifies three dominant ideological positions in China between 1949 and 1993: traditional collectivism (before the Cultural Revolution), radical collectivism (during the Cultural Revolution), and regulated individualism (after the Cultural Revolution). The empirical work is a study of "Jiaoyu Yanjiao" ("Educational Research"), the most important Chinese education journal, published by the Central Institute of Educational Research. The journal was created in 1978 by the Institute to support the new education reform in China. The paper's major empirical analysis is on the papers published by the journal on moral education. The reform policy in China introduced by the Chinese government in 1978 had necessitated a fundamental shift in what constituted the core elements of the dominant ideological positions of the State, involving certain elements of autonomy introduced to the intellectual field. But the exercise of the newly granted freedom was conditional, leading to a shift in the modality of controlling the intellectual field exercised by the State and an effect on the ways educational theories are produced and reported in the journal. Contains a figure, 7 tables, and 19 references. (Author/BT)

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ED 453 141

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paper presented to Comparative and International Education Society 45th Annual Meeting, 2001, Washington, D.C.

SO 032 803

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CHEUNG, Kwok Wah

Department of Education,
University of Hong Kong

Correspondence:
CHEUNG, Kwok Wah
Department of Education
University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam Road
HONG KONG
People's Republic of China
E-mail: kwcheung@hkusua.hku.hk

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Abstract

Based on the theory of pedagogic discourse developed by Bernstein, this paper discusses the relationship between the production of intellectual discourse and the Chinese State emerged after the Cultural Revolution. The paper identifies three different dominant ideological positions in China between 1949 and 1993. They are, namely, traditional collectivism (before the Cultural Revolution), radical collectivism (during the Cultural Revolution) and regulated individualism (after the Cultural Revolution). The empirical work is a study of the most important education journal, *Jiaoyu Yanjiao (Educational Research)* published by the Central Institute of Educational Research. The journal was created in 1978 by the Institute to support the new education reform initiated as part of the Post Cultural Revolution reform in China. The major empirical analysis presented in this paper is on the papers published by the journal on moral education. Essentially, the paper argues that the reform policy in China introduced by the Chinese Government in 1978 had necessitated a fundamental shift in what constituted the core elements of the dominant ideological positions of the State. This involves certain elements of autonomy introduced to the intellectual field. But the exercise of the newly granted freedom is conditional. This led to a shift in the modality of controlling the intellectual field exercised by the State and has an effect upon the ways in which educational theories are produced and reported in the journal.

Introduction

The findings presented in this paper is drawn from a larger research project which aims to understand the relationship between the State and the intellectual discourse in China in the Post-Cultural Revolution reform project started in the late 70's. An important feature of the relationship between the State and intellectuals after the Cultural Revolution in China is concerned with the seemingly contradictory love-hate relationship between them. On one hand, the modernization project necessitates a more active role for the intellectuals in the production and reproduction of discourses. However, the active participation has to be regulated because the State does not want this newly created discursive space to become a source for the challenge of the socialist order.

In this paper, we shall first of all discuss the theory of pedagogic discourse developed by Bernstein and how his theoretical formulation helps to inform our understanding of the development of an important education journal in this new Chinese context. We shall then discuss the ideo-political and institutional contexts in China upon which the journal in this study, *Jiaoyu Yanjiao* (Educational Research), had been established. We shall then go on to present

findings from our empirical analysis of a selected section of papers published by the journal.

Bernstein: The Theory of Pedagogic Discourse

From the point of view of the theories developed by Bernstein, the research presented in this paper is essentially about the nature of changes in symbolic control in a specific and historical conjuncture in China: the Post-Cultural Revolution reform in China. Here, symbolic control is defined as

> "the means whereby consciousness is given a specialised from and distributed through forms of communication which relay a given distribution of power and dominant cultural categories. Symbolic control translates power relations into discourse and discourse into power relations... [and] it can also transform those very power relations" (Bernstein, 1990a:134).

Bernstein is interested in how power is exercised to create pedagogic subjects. He develops the model of pedagogic device to help him to understand the process of the exercise of power to maintain the relationship between social categories and the discourses they produced.

Figure 1. A Simplified Model of the Realization of the Pedagogic Device



(Pedagogic Device)

According to Bernstein, the pedagogic device acts to create specific pedagogic communication through which subjects are given pedagogic identities and through which pedagogic identities are distributed. The pedagogic device is constituted by three interrelated rules: distributive rules, recontextualising rules and evaluation rules. These rules are hierarchically situated in such a way

that distributive rules regulate recontextualising rules that in turn give rise to evaluation rules (Bernstein, 1996a: 42) (Fig. 1). As our research is essentially concerned with the production of discourse in the field of education during and after the Cultural Revolution in China, we shall discuss the discursive relationship between the distributive and recontextualising rules of the pedagogic device.

The first level of rules in the pedagogic device is distributive rules. Distributive rules are principles which "regulate the relationship between power, social groups, forms of consciousness and practice" through "establishing control on the specialization and distribution of different orders of meaning" to agents from different social groups (Bernstein, 1990:180). For Bernstein, distributive rules define the gap and also who has access to the gap between the unthinkable and thinkable, which ultimately regulate the "what" and "who" of the production of discourse. Thus different distributive rules privilege different types of voices, their boundaries and hence limitations, and also their voices of opposition.

The second level in the pedagogic device is the recontextualising rules. While distributive rules are concerned with the production of discourse, recontextualising rules are concerned with the construction of pedagogic discourse that "is a principle for appropriating other discourses and bringing them into a special relation with each other for the purpose of their selective transmission and acquisition" (Bernstein, 1986:183-184). It is in essence a principle for appropriating knowledge from various other discourses to form its own discourse for cultural reproduction. For example, in the teaching of mathematics in secondary school, mathematical knowledge is selected to become school knowledge, as part of the pedagogic discourse of mathematics. What counts now is the social logic involved in selecting various aspects (sequence, pace and methods of teaching) of mathematics for teaching to different groups of students. Now the pedagogic discourse of mathematics education is socially and discursively different from the discourse that produces mathematics knowledge in the field of production.

In this paper, we argue that in China, especially in the Post-Cultural Revolution reform, discursive space for intellectuals to think about problems and to exercise "intellectual" imaginations is created as a result of ideological shifts within the State. This historical condition has given rise to a specific realization of the hierarchical relations between distributive rules and recontextualising rules.

We shall argue in this paper there are three ideological positions which we consider regulating the distributive rules between 1949 and today in China,

hence generating three discourses of socialism. They are, namely, traditional collectivism, radical collectivism and regulated individualism.

The idea that there are three different ideological positions in Chinese socialism is not new. As early as 1984, Riskin suggests that throughout the course of Chinese socialism between 1949 and the eighties, there have been three visions of socialism: Maoist model, central planning model and market socialism model (Riskin, 1984). He criticizes Western Chinese observers who have taken Chinese political rhetoric for granted and wrongly accepts that the Chinese ideological struggle is basically a two-line struggle: a struggle between capitalism and socialism. It is, according to him, a struggle among three visions of socialism.

The idea of three visions of socialism is also adopted by Kraus in his analysis of Chinese cultural politics since 1949: bureaucratic, radical mass mobilization and market orientation (Kraus, 1984: 48-49). In a bureaucratic system, the bureaucrats work for the State to decide what is suitable for the masses in the field of cultural consumption: to be inspired, to be entertained or to be educated. Professional artists are merely State salaried employees working in the State cultural organs to implement the decisions made by the bureaucracy (Kraus, 1984:49). In the radical mass mobilization model, professional artists have to give way to "amateur" but true mass artists. In this way, cultural consumption is always an expression of socialist culture, mostly about the glorification of the hard work of the peasants and factory workers. In the market system, individual artists are given the chance to produce their own cultural products and to compete for their own audience (Kraus, 1984).

The idea of three visions of socialism has also been applied in analyzing changes of education policies in China. Acknowledging the influence of Solinger's work, Sautman proposes three forms of politicization of Chinese Education, which serve to inform their respective policy content. They are namely, politicized, hyperpoliticised and depoliticised, which correspond respectively to the ideological positions for bureaucratic, radical and reform policy content (Sautman, 1991) (Table 1).

Table 1 A Summary of Sautman's Phases of Policy Positions and Ideological Positions Proposed in this Thesis.

Period (proposed by Sautman)	1950s, 1970s	1957-58, 1966-76	1978 until now
Policy Content (proposed by Sautman)	Bureaucratic	Radical	Reform
Educational/ Political Policy (proposed by	Politicised	Hyperpoliticised	depoliticised

Sautman)			

(Source: adapted from table 1 in Sautman, Barry, 1991,)

We find Sautman's distinction very useful. In this paper, we shall take up this issue and go on to propose three ideological positions which served to inform the production of discourses since 1949: traditional collectivism, radical collectivism and regulated individualism.

We shall now outline the dominant ideological positions, their implications and the oppositional voice [1] in the three phases of development between 1949 until today.

Three Socialist Discourses

In this section, we are going to give an outline of three socialist discourses developed in China between 1949 and today. Our interest in this paper is to understand the effects of the third position, namely, regulated individualism in the production of discourses. Hence we are only able to give an outline of the first two socialist discourses: traditional collectivism and radical collectivism. More discussion will be provided on the third discourse, regulated individualism.

The first discourse of Chinese socialism to be considered in this paper, traditional collectivism was from 1949 to 1966, with the exception of 1957-58 when the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward.

Traditional collectivism refers to a conception that embeds the individual completely in the socialist collectivity. This in turn creates the legitimate ideological consciousness of the relationship between the individual and the collective where the latter is foregrounded and the former finds its role within the collective. This concept, which positions individuals within the collective, is supported, maintained and legitimated by the social organization of production. The construction of individuals is always instrumental to the development of the collective.

The essence of traditional collectivism is the idea of the primacy of collectivist over individualist considerations. The role of the individual is thus defined by its position within the individual-collective relationship. In the field of production, traditional collectivism is concerned with the function of

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1 The exception is the absence of an oppositional voice during the Cultural Revolution. In a way, it was a silenced voice, rather than an absent voice. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the reform after the Cultural Revolution could be launched so successfully. The silenced voice served as an important discursive source for the emergence of regulated individualism.

individuals within the collectivist units of production. In moral education, the concern is for individuals to accept the need to be committed to such a function and relations.

In traditional collectivism, the emphasis is upon a total submission of individuals to the State. The roles of individuals are derived from their positions in the collectivity to which they belong. Traditional collectivism leads to an expansion of social, economic and political regulators over individuals. The central issue constructed under traditional collectivism is that of economic development. Education is about providing a corpus of highly trained experts.

We shall now proceed to the discussion of radical collectivism. In this paper, radical collectivism refers to the dominant ideological position advocated briefly during the Great Leap Forward (1957-58) and then during the Cultural Revolution in China. In the language of pedagogic device, a basic feature of the Cultural Revolution was the fusion of the distributive rules and recontextualisation rules, resulting in integration between production and education. A substantive analysis of the reform during the Cultural Revolution is made by the author (Cheung, 1987), despite the concept of radical collectivism was not yet developed for the conceptual analysis.

Mao regards traditional collectivism as potentially dangerous for the socialist project and launched the Cultural Revolution on the ideological basis of radical collectivism. It implies the end of intellectuals' monopoly as producers and disseminators of knowledge. It also leads to a fusion of the distributive rules and recontextualised rules. Hence, knowledge is supposed to be produced and recontextualised in the same site. The dominance of ideological discourse over the society means that educational knowledge is in fact equivalent to political and ideological knowledge and hence there is no discursive autonomy for the development of the content, method and evaluation of education. Content, method and evaluation of education are only to be derived from the ideological discourse of Mao.

The Party now totally controlled, in Bernstein's terms, the field of production of knowledge and the recontextualisation field. Thus, those who had access to the site of the unthinkable and the thinkable were now the new privileged social groups selected by the State, i.e. the workers and the peasants. Intellectuals had access only if they transformed themselves into workers or peasants, thus fulfilling the criteria of "red" and "expert". Effectively, the role of intellectuals as the producers and disseminators of knowledge was removed and the intellectuals dispersed among the workers. The ivory tower of education as a separate social institution was demolished and then rebuilt all over China as integrated workshops of factories, farms, teaching and research institutions. Intellectuals, now including workers, had to carry out their research work at the

shop floor. However, we must stress that intellectuals as such were not opposed during the Cultural Revolution. Intellectuals would only be denounced if they did not become "revolutionary intellectuals". For Mao, the only option for intellectuals was to become both "red" and "expert". Thus, the production of discourse must be derived from the revolutionary discourse prescribed by Mao. It is thus possible for us to suggest that, during the Cultural Revolution, the production of knowledge was regulated through the integration of education and economic production.

We shall now proceed to the discussion of the third socialist discourse. Reforms in the Post-Cultural Revolution era means that socialism, expressed in the form of radical collectivism, can be rectified but should not be abandoned. In the words of Tsou, this is a "retreat of politics as reflected in ideological discourse" (Tsou, 1986:151-159). Thus we can ask if political positions are now no longer the sole positions in ideological discourse? What are the newly accepted positions then? In the field of education, this means that there is a need to examine the nature of the dynamics as education is now regarded by the state as more than the transmission of political ideology. At the same time, an element of individualistic values is injected into the existing collectivistic values. A new balance between the individuals and the collective must be created to legitimate the new ideological position.

In the economic field, modernization is expected to lead to a form of entrepreneurialism that creates an economic space for individuals, firms and geographical regions. These entrepreneurial forms are to be recognized by the Party as an important strategy for raising the material level of the society. These new forms entail a new tolerance of the Party for the space an individual can construct in the economic arena. This new balance between individual and collective creates a greater but still limited autonomy for individuals. We refer to this change in the balance as regulated individualism. However, this does not mean the recognition of individualism as understood in the Western sense. Indeed, Western individualism is still very much rejected by the Party [2]. Individualism is not recognized as a moral principle but as a conditional strategy. Regulated individualism may well be, from the point of view of the Party, an outcome of the modernization project. For some, this space represents a potential for legitimating more intensive involvement for a civil society. Thus new conflicts are created in the move from an ideology of traditional collectivism to an ideology of regulated individualism.

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2 For example, the Party blames the wide spread of bourgeoisie liberalism on the democratic movement in the summer of 1989.

Regulated individualism refers to the new role of individuals tolerated by the Party in the fields of economics and education [3]. It may well be the case that even in these two different fields, there are different forms of regulated individualism. In the economic field, it refers to the emergence of individual traders and manufacturers as agents of new forms of production activities. In the field of education, it refers to the recognition of individual space in the transmission process, although it alerts individuals to the danger of abusing this newly recognized conditional autonomy. It creates conflicts with the ideology of traditional collectivism because regulated individualism stresses certain extent of autonomy for individuals. The Party recognizes it as an important strategy for raising the material level of the society. Individualism is not recognized as a moral principle, but as a conditional strategy which supposedly lead to an increase in the rate of production.

The abandoning of radical collectivism means that the homogeneity of ideological positioning ceases to exist. However, this new form of individualism has created problems for the State, which led to certain ambivalent positions of the State with regard to the control of this emerging individualism. Goldman describes Chinese society in the early 80's as being in a state of "political openness, literary repression" (Goldman, 1994:62-87). Schram suggests that the extent to which "freedom or democracy Deng [is] prepared to accept" is circumscribed by both "internal" and "external" constraints. By "internal", he means "limits set by the balance within the Party and especially within the top leadership" (Schram, 1986:8). The lefties represent the conservative voice and often acted as patrons of traditional collectivism. By "external", he means "the limitations set by the ideas or instinctive reactions of Deng Xiaopeng himself and of other partisans of reform to their own actions". Thus, "when ... free discussions... appear to be developing a momentum which threatens Party control, he [Deng] himself feels obliged to call a halt" (Schram, 1986:9).

In this paper, we argue that the emergence of regulated individualism is a response to the new era. We shall use one incident happened in mid eighties to illustrate the controversies related to the emergence of regulated individualism: the campaign against spiritual pollution in 1983. It was a campaign launched by the CCP to react against what they saw as a concerted move to promote Western bourgeois liberal ideas in Chinese society. For the CCP, there is a clear difference between learning useful ideas from the West and wholesale westernisation. In this particular campaign, the issue at stake was an argument first raised by Wang Ruishui, an associate editor with *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* as early as 1980 on the possible existence of alienation in a socialist nation. For Wang, alienation does not cease to exist in socialism. He then goes on to identify possible

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3 In this thesis, the field of education is taken an important site in the field of symbolic control.

ideological, political and economic alienation in socialism (Brugger and Kelly, 1990:145-6). This has become a contentious issue within various intellectual circles and over six hundred papers have been published in various newspaper and journals (Goldman, 1994:116). In China, where the State is the arbitrator of the distinction between the thinkable and unthinkable, such a discussion would be regarded as illegitimate when the discussion is likely to be recontextualised in a way which the State sees as rendering potential challenge to the fundamental order it is maintaining.

When Wang revised his work in 1983, it was regarded as an offensive to socialism by the conservative ideologues. The campaign against spiritual pollution was thus officially launched in a speech made by Wang Zhen, who was a Politburo member and the President of the Central Party School [4] on October 1983. In his speech entitled *Guard against and Remove Spiritual Pollution on the Ideological Front; Raise High the Banner of Marxism and Socialism*, Wang suggested that,

> "There are also those who are constantly propagating so-called 'socialist alienation', saying something to the effect that socialism suffers not only from ideological alienation, but from political alienation, and economic alienation. They even go so far to say 'the roots of alienation are to be found in the socialist system itself'. These views are entirely opposed to Marxist scientific socialism." (quoted from Schram, 1984:46)

A number of articles followed suit. However, what was supposed to be an ideological campaign among intellectual circles became a social and political campaign against the reform. It became too much for the Party leaders when the grassroots organization issued directives concerning appropriate dress and hairstyles, and general moral conduct for all citizens. Others began to challenge the emerging responsibility system, a core reform measure advocated by Deng since the early 80's. The Party thus had to call an end to the issue after one year of confusion. It was signaled by the publication of a paper from Hu Qioamu, a senior Party ideologue, who

> "condemned the application of theory of alienation to socialist society but accepted a compromise in affirming the validity of 'humanism' as an 'ethical

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4 The Central Party School is a political training school reserved for senior cadres. However, one should not have the impression that it is a site for, using our language, traditional collectivism. It is also the place for Hu Yaobang, as the second vice-president for the School to prepare the ideological battle with the "whateverists".

> principle and moral norm' within the framework of historical materialism." (Tsou, 1984:332).

From the point of view of this paper, the conditionality of academic freedom is clear. Clearly this is not the type of freedom understood in the West, in which the State may only indirectly affect intellectual activity through various forms of public funding and procedures of assessment. In China, the State has always been the patron of intellectuals (Lo, 1992), and hence the recognition of the need to regulate intellectual activities. The problem is only how. After the Cultural Revolution, the control was through an assessment through which the discourse was recontextualised in the light of the practice of the discourse.

From this point of view, autonomy is a consequence of the legitimate use of the space made available for intellectuals. It thus creates a space which intellectuals may use to request more autonomy or even challenge the monopoly of political power held by the State. Some intellectuals do use the potential of the space to request greater autonomy or even to challenge the political power of the State. However, the State does not regress to the previous position of radical collectivism. It does not respond by a wholesale repression of intellectuals but targets those who are regarded as sabotaging the Socialist State. From the point of view of this thesis, these intellectuals have in the course of exercising the newly granted conditional autonomy, crossed the line.

Inherent in the newly emerging recontextualisation field is the role of educational theory in the modernization program. As political ideology partially retreats from various discourses, intellectuals are beginning to look for new positions, which do not step outside the boundaries of regulative individualism.

A summary of our ideological positions and the comparison between the three phases of policy positions proposed by Sautman is provided below.

Table 2 A Comparison of Sautman's Phases of Policy Positions and Ideological Positions Proposed in this Paper

Period	1950s, 1970s	1957-58, 1966-76	1978 until now
Policy Content (proposed by Sautman)	Bureaucratic	Radical	Reform
Educational/ Political Policy (proposed by Sautman)	Politicized	Hyperpoliticized	Depoliticized
Ideological Positions (proposed in this thesis)	Traditional Collectivism	Radical Collectivism	Regulated Individualism

Oppositional ideological positions	Radical Collectivism	Traditional Collectivism (suppressed voice)	Traditional Collectivism

Source: adapted from table 1 in Sautman, Barry, 1991.

Jiaoyu Yanjiao and Moral Education

Jiaoyu Yanjiu is published by the Central Institute of Educational Research in China and is generally regarded as the most influential educational journal in China. Between 1979 and 1993, *Jiaoyu Yanjiu* published a total of 3197 papers. Because of vast number of papers published over the years, we have chosen to study one domain of the emerging educational discourse: moral education. There is one further reason for choosing to analyze the moral education discourse. In the Chinese ideo-political discourse, moral education is often referred to as spiritual civilization. It is not easy to explain the meaning of the phrase spiritual civilization. In the West, the church, for example, diagnoses what is often called the spiritual state of the nation and makes proposals to improve the state. The church, however, is not in a position to effect changes. In the context of contemporary China, the construction and evaluation of spiritual civilization is made by the Party in the light of the interpretations of Marxist, Maoist and Leninist theory. Thus any change in these interpretations in the Chinese context raises the question about the implication of spiritual civilization. Therefore a detailed analysis of the papers in the journal *Jiaoyu Yanjiu* dealing with this issue should be a good empirical study for the study of the emergence of regulated individualism as discussed earlier.

As suggested above, unlike moral education as a school subject in the West, moral education was regarded, traditionally, as part of ideo-political education. A new era of politics has always been accompanied by renewed calls for new form and content of moral or ideo-political education. Thus, one would not be surprised to find that the launch of modernization has been accompanied by a new discourse of moral education. This has been reflected in the construction of policy for moral education since 1980.

One example can be found in *A Notice Issued by the CCP Central Committee with Regard to Strengthening Ideological Work in the Countryside*, which was issued in January 1983. The emphasis of the document is on the ideological issues in the economy. In the *Notice*, the notion of the individual was recognized. The document suggested that,

> "we must manage the relationship well between the interests of the state, of the collective, and of the

> individual. We must also handle the relationship well between autonomy and following the guidance of state planning, and the relationship between an individual striving to enrich himself through labor and developing a sense of solidarity and mutual assistance, of having those who get rich first to help those who get rich later, and a sense that we will all get rich together." (Central Committee, CCP, 1983:18)

In this notice, ideological issues are now being discussed in its economic context. Little is said on moral education. In 1985, the CCP Central Committee issued another notice on ideological character and political theory. In the notice, two third of the content is concerned with the issue of what the curriculum of a Marxist ideology course should be. However, the whole of the third section of the notice is devoted to the discussion of appropriate teaching methods for moral and political lessons. Here, the notice suggests that, "we must turn from the method of indoctrination in our teaching to a teaching that emphasizes enlightenment. We must learn to guide students to enhance their knowledge and understanding through their own studies and by their own thinking"(Central Committee, CCP, 1985: 29).

The notice also lays down some guidelines in handling controversial issues. They suggest that teachers might,

> "on the premise of upholding the Four Basic Principles, introduce to students, with a serious and scientific attitude, diverse academic and intellectual points of view as well as the teachers' own viewpoints and opinion, and to express opinions alongside the students and their opinions, thus lead the students, through earnest and absorbing discussions, to master Marxist methods and theoretical principles" (Central Committee, CCP, 1985:30).

This should not be taken to mean legitimating professional freedom for Chinese teachers. Indeed, the advice given clearly suggested that this newly approved space had to be circumscribed within certain premises. On the other hand, the authority now formally recognizes the possibility of individual differences. More importantly, a notion of method has been introduced in this emerging discourse of moral education. Thus any new space that is accorded to this emerging discourse of moral education could now be realized through different teaching methods. We consider that this is likely to privilege an educational voice rather than an ideological voice. Indeed, a later document reveals that the notion of teaching methods is given an increasingly important

place in the discourse. We are suggesting that the ideology of regulated individualism is systematically re-contextualised to become an educational discourse.

The State Education Commission issued a syllabus for moral and ideological education in primary schools in 1986. The syllabus lays down the specific content for various stages in primary schooling. The last section of the syllabus suggests some "fundamental principles" underpinning the syllabus. Except for the first, which is on the importance of upholding communist ideology, the other six are about suggestions for different teaching methods. They included paying attention to "surveys and research studies"; organizing teaching which correspond to the characteristics and receptivity of students at various levels and insisting on "the elicitation method of teaching" (State Education Commission, 1986, pp. 45-46).

Thus it seems appropriate for us to analyze the moral education papers published by the journal. A total of 232 papers on moral education were published by *Jiaoyu Yanjiu* between 1979, when it was founded, and 1993.

We shall now turn to explaining the analysis of the moral education papers.

Analyzing Moral Education Papers: Ideological Orientation and Pedagogic Practice

In this section, we shall introduce two concepts to help us to analyze the moral education papers. They are, namely, ideological orientation and pedagogic practice.

The Ideological orientation of a paper refers to a text which recontextualises political and ideological sources and privileges forms of ideological practice. These are ideological sources legitimated by party documents, resolutions and suggestions made by senior politicians. Papers published with this orientation thus tend to be concerned with the ideological debates in the wider society, as well as the ideological assumptions underlying various forms of pedagogic organization and practices. They usually take the form of elaborating a recently endorsed document, policy initiative, important policy direction advocated by senior politicians or even a re-reading of the discussion made by important political figures in the light of the current situation.

We propose to hypothesize here that the ideological orientation of a paper (traditional collectivism or restricted individualism) would be associated with

the ideological orientation of the time. We need to point out that although we identified three socialist discursive positions earlier in this paper, it is very unlikely that papers written during our research period to be based upon radical collectivism. The Chinese modernization project is launched on the clear consensus made by the Chinese Community Party that the Cultural Revolution project is not the way forward for Chinese socialism. The ideological debate about the choice between a retrospective identity as depicted in the traditional collectivism or prospective identity as depicted in regulated individualism. From the point of view of the West, this is often presented as a debate between liberal and conservative ideology.

Pedagogic practice refers to papers that recontextualise pedagogic sources and foreground pedagogic theories and practices. Papers published in this orientation tend to be concerned with educational problems or the pedagogic connotation of certain ideological orientations. These are papers which offer either a theoretical discussion of various models about moral education, or discuss various aspects of the issue.

In theory, we shall be able to identify the following three categories of papers:

- ideological orientation only (either traditional collectivism or regulated individualism paper)
- ideological orientation (either traditional collectivism or regulated individualism paper) with explicit pedagogic practice
- pedagogic practice without explicit ideological orientation

We shall now proceed to the discussion of ideological orientation only papers. These are papers which articulate mainly the ideological issues concerning the nature of moral education. A summary of the papers is presented below (table 4).

Table 3 The Distribution of Ideological Orientation Only Papers between 1981 and 1993

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989 (Jan-June)	1989 (Jun-Dec.)	1990	1991	1992	1993
TC	2	8	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0
RI	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0

TC: Traditional Collectivism RI: Regulated Individualism

A number of observations can be made about the above table.

First, given the importance of ideology in the discussion of moral education, it is surprising and perhaps interesting that the total number of papers on ideological orientation without explicit pedagogic practice is so limited. Over the years, there are only 25 papers, representing 10.8% of all papers in moral education.

Second, we can still detect the trend of change in the ideological orientations of the papers. In the years 1981 - 1984, all ideological orientation papers (18 papers, 72% of all ideological orientation papers) are about elaborating traditional collectivism. Between 1985 and before June 1989, there are only two ideological orientation papers, both celebrating regulated individualism. After June 1989, there are five ideological orientation papers, four of which emphasize traditional collectivism and one emphasizes regulated individualism. Thus it seems justified to suggest that the emergence of regulated individualism as an alternative but legitimate orientation has been disrupted because of the incident in June 1989.

Fourth, there is a long-term decline in the importance of ideological orientation papers over the years. 72% of all ideological orientation papers were published between the years 1981 and 1984. There are no more ideological orientation papers published since 1992. The debate in ideology appears to have moved from the foreground to the background.

We shall now turn our attention to discussing papers with ideological orientations.

Table 4 Summary of the Distribution of Ideological Orientations (Traditional Collectivism/Regulated Individualism) with Pedagogic Practice Papers between 1981 and 1993

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989 (Jan-June)	1989 (Jun-Dec.)	1990	1991	1992	1993
TC(PP)	6	6	2	4	2	0	1	2	0	1	1	1	0	0
RI (PP)	0	0	0	0	5	1	2	8	4	0	0	1	0	3

TC (PP): Traditional Collectivism with Pedagogic Practice
RI (PP): Regulated Individualism with Pedagogic Practice

It is clear from the above table that the pattern for ideological orientation only papers is repeated again. In the first period (between 1981 and 1984), there are 18 papers on traditional collectivism with pedagogic practice [TC(PP)] but none on regulated individualism with pedagogic practice [RI(PP)]. The dominance of TC(PP) is reversed in the second period (between 1985 and June 1989). Now the majority of papers are on RI(PP) (20 papers). On the other hand,

there are only a total of 5 papers on TC(PP). Again, June 1989 is the "fault" line. The editors published relatively more papers on TC(PP) in the first half of the third period (July 1989 and 1993) and then relatively more papers on RI(PP) in the second half of the period. The overall pattern remains the same. The number is however very small and therefore our interpretation must be tentative only.

Second, we may also examine the forms of pedagogic practice through which the ideological orientation is speaking. For TC(PP) papers, a total of twenty seven papers covering the whole range of classification of pedagogic practice – eight groups of pedagogic practice, the largest two groups being general (six papers) and methods of teaching (eleven papers). However, for RI(PP) papers, there are only twenty-four papers in four groups. The largest group is general with seventeen papers. The content of all the RI(PP)–general papers is mainly about the theoretical aspects of the pedagogy projected from that specific ideological orientation. It seems that in the TC(PP) group, the concern emphasizes the application of the ideological orientation to various aspects of the pedagogic practice of moral education. Here, the issue is not, as in the case of traditional collectivism, to explore the nature of pedagogic practice, but to show how regulated individualism is to be implemented in the pedagogic sphere. In a sense, it is a pedagogisation of political ideology.

The authors are now more concerned with creating and exploring the nature and the intrinsic property of the pedagogic space generated by regulated individualism. The link between regulated individualism and specific pedagogic practices has to be worked out. It is as if the authors are constructing their own educational ideology in the space permitted by the State. To use the language of the pedagogic device, two different principles of distributive rules privilege two different forms of pedagogic recontextualisation. We shall come back to this point after we have considered the final group of papers: pedagogic practice without explicit ideological orientation.

We shall now turn our attention to the last category of paper: pedagogic practice only paper. This is the largest group of paper on moral education published by the journal. A total of 147 PP papers were published between 1981 and 1993 (63.6% of the total number of papers).

Table 5 Distribution of Pedagogic Practice Papers in the journal

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989 (Jan-June)	1989 (Jun-Dec.)	1990	1991	1992	1993
Number of papers	28	13	12	5	6	9	9	9	2	9	14	14	11	6

Given the importance of ideology in the discussion of moral education, it is somewhat surprising that the majority of papers published in this category do not directly addressing ideological issues. Indeed, in the first period in our research (between 1981 and 1984), the journal published a total of fifty-eight PP papers (39.5% of all PP papers).

Compared with papers in the previous analysis, the concerns of the authors in the practice categories are more varied. Given the limitation of space, we are unable to give a full summary of these papers. However, it is possible for us to further explore our major concern. Our concern here is the extent to which the shift from traditional collectivism to regulated individualism has also affected the development of forms of pedagogic practice in PP papers. Although the arguments in these papers are not constructed with explicit reference to, legitimated by or derived from any ideological statements, it may be possible for us to understand whether or not a paper is embedded in an ideological orientation. Since we have been able to demonstrate that two ideological orientations (traditional collectivism and regulated individualism) construct different pedagogic discourses, we should be able to extract major concepts and assumptions which are intrinsic to the relevant ideological orientations. In other words, it should be possible for us to establish the pedagogic voice through which an ideological orientation is speaking.

This, however, does not mean the pedagogic discourses, implying traditional collectivism and regulated individualism, do not have concerns common to them. For example, it is clear that the two pedagogic discourses entail a concept of teachers. The revolutionary pedagogic practice dominant during the Cultural Revolution does not necessitate a concept of teachers. Although teachers existed during the Cultural Revolution, they did not exist as agents of a specialized activity in the symbolic field. Instead, they were expected to be part of the revolutionary agents in the integrated fields of production and symbolic control. As the Post-Cultural Revolution era entails a separation of the fields of production and symbolic control, teachers regain their own specialized status as the major agents in the field of education. However, it is also clear that their roles as the agents in the field of education are defined differently under traditional collectivism and regulated individualism.

Based on close reading of the papers, we have produced a list of important concepts and notions associated with the two ideological orientations. The list becomes our checklist of attributes. It should be noted that our list of attributes is gathered from traditional collectivism (pedagogic practice) and regulated individualism (pedagogic practice) and these attributes are being applied to the PP papers.

In this exercise, the task is to determine whether any paper can act as the implicit voice of an ideological orientation. For each paper, there are three possibilities: (1) traditional collectivism; (2) regulated individualism or (3) neutral. In the case of (1) or (2), this means that the argument developed is embedded in either traditional collectivism or regulated individualism. In the case of (3), the argument developed cannot be assigned to either. The result is presented in Table 6.

Table 6 Distribution of Pedagogic Practice Papers with Respect to ideological orientation between 1981 and 1993

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989 (Jan-June)	1989 (Jun-Dec.)	1990	1991	1992	1993
TC biased	7	7	3	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	4	2	1	0
RI biased	3	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	0	3	4	4	4	2
Neutral	9	2	5	2	1	7	6	5	0	3	6	8	5	2

TC biased: PP paper biased towards traditional collectivism
RI biased: PP paper biased towards regulated individualism

We can see that the previous pattern of shift between traditional collectivism and regulated individualism reappears. Between 1981 and 1984, there are eighteen papers which were have been regarded as biased towards traditional collectivism. But at the same time, only nine papers have been regarded as biased towards regulated individualism. The emphasis is reversed in the years between 1985 and June 1989, when three papers are found to be biased towards traditional collectivism but eight papers were biased towards regulated individualism. The trend again comes to a halt after July 1989, after which the journal publishes more papers on both traditional collectivism and regulated individualism biased PP papers.

In this paper, we have mainly outlined two almost parallel discourses of moral education. We use the word "almost" because we have clearly demonstrated that they have different forms of recontextualisations. When we compare the distribution of papers, we find that there are approximately seven times more traditional collectivism without pedagogic practice papers than traditional collectivism with pedagogic practice papers. However, the number of papers for traditional collectivism with pedagogic practice is more or less the same as that of regulated individualism with pedagogic practice (twenty-seven for the former and twenty-four for the latter during the whole period). Moreover, eighteen of the twenty-two traditional collectivism without pedagogic practice papers (81.8%) appeared in the first period (1981-1984). Whereas in the case of regulated individualism without pedagogic practice papers, there is none in the same period. We can raise here the question whether it is dangerous to express regulative individualism directly in general papers even under the conditions of weaker party control. If this is to be the case, we might expect regulated individualism to appear in a more embedded form, i.e. expressed through discussions of pedagogic practice. Our analysis will become clearer if we integrate the above results in one table, which is presented below (table 7).

Table 7 The Distribution of TC and RI related papers between 1981 and 1993

		Traditional Collectivism A			Regulated Individualism B		
		TC related papers			RI related papers		
		TC	TC (PP)	TC biased PP	RI	RI (PP)	RI biased PP
1	1981	2	6	7	0	0	3
	1982	8	6	7	0	0	2
	1983	2	2	3	0	0	3
	1984	6	4	1	0	0	1
	Sub-total	18	18	18	0	0	9
2	1985	0	0	2	0	5	2
	1986	0	0	0	0	1	2
	1987	0	2	0	1	2	2
	1988	0	1	1	1	8	2
	Jan-Jun, 89	0	0	0	0	4	0
	Sub-total	0	3	3	2	20	8
3	Jul-Dec, 89	2	1	1	0	0	3
	1990	1	1	4	0	0	4
	1991	1	1	2	1	1	4
	1992	0	1	1	0	0	4
	1993	0	0	0	0	3	2
	Sub-total	4	4	8	1	4	17
	TOTAL	22	25	29	3	24	34

TC: traditional collectivism papers
TC (PP): traditional collectivism with pedagogic practice papers
TC biased PP: pedagogic practice without explicit ideological orientation (traditional collectivism biased) papers
RI: regulated individualism papers
RI(PP): regulated individualism with pedagogic practice papers
RI biased PP: pedagogic practice without explicit ideological orientation (regulated individualism biased) papers

First, majority of the TC related papers (A blocks 1, 2 and 3) are published in the first period 1981 - 1984 (block 1A).

Second, it is clear that in the second and third period (block 2A and 3A) there are very few traditional collectivism papers devoted only to ideology. In these two periods, traditional collectivism reveals itself through pedagogic practice papers (both traditional collectivism with pedagogic practice papers and pedagogic practice but traditional collectivism biased paper). Furthermore, 62.9% of all traditional collectivism biased paper are to be found in the first period 1981 - 1984.

Third, as we noted before there are only three regulated individualism without pedagogic practice papers across the whole period. There are nine regulated individualism biased pedagogic practice papers in the first period but no regulated individualism paper devoted wholly to ideology (block 1B). In the second phase, there are two and a half times more regulated individualism with pedagogic practice paper than regulated individualism biased papers (block 2B) but in the third period this relation is reversed for here there are four times more regulated individualism biased paper than only pedagogic practice papers. (Block 3B)

There is no need to discuss the dominance of traditional collectivism in the first period here. We have also discussed the low incidence of regulated individualism papers devoted solely to ideology. However, what has been revealed in this analysis is that there are nine PP (RI biased) papers and no papers devoted solely to regulated individualism in the first period. A possible explanation that in the first period, despite the dominance of traditional collectivism, there was latent regulated individualism positions which could not be explicitly expressed and appeared in a disguised form. In the second period, there was a marked shift away from biased pedagogic practice papers to the more direct form of RI(PP) papers. It is also in the second period that papers devoted solely to regulated individualism appeared (1987 and 1988). In the third period, following the Tiananmen Incident, regulated individualism papers reverted back to their biased realization. Perhaps the shift between the periods gives some plausibility to our initial explanation of the appearance of the only regulated individualism papers in the first period were the PP (RI biased) papers.

It is thus clear that the construction of regulated individualism is through discussing forms of pedagogy and its ideological implication. Hence, its discursive source is based upon constructing a symbolic boundary between an individual and the collectivity to which the individual belongs. In the case of traditional collectivism, the individual is defined with reference to the collectivity and hence the homogeneity of individuals within the collectivity is emphasized. Thus, the concern is always about the willingness of individual to

submit himself/herself to the collectivity. In the case of regulated individualism, there is an emphasis of the discursive space occupied by individual and hence the heterogeneity between individuals is emphasized. Two theories for moral education are entailed in two ideological orientations within the field of production of discourse. From this point of view, regulated individualism is always a latent potential of the recontextualisation field but traditional collectivism is always a possible position.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have outlined the theoretical framework developed by Bernstein which underpins our study of the development of an education journal in China. We also argue that there are historical three fundamental ideological positions in the socialist China and that the Post-Cultural Revolution project is based upon the growing acceptance of a new ideological position which we have named as regulated individualism. We propose that regulated individualism is about offering more personal discursive space in new economic order. However, this newly individualistic position should not be used to challenge the fundamental social order and hence should be regulated once when it crosses the line. Hence the emergence of regulated individualism means a total rejection of radical collectivism, the dominant ideological position during the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, the position of traditional collectivism is not abandoned and will be "activated" when regulated individualism is deemed to have crossed the line. The empirical data is derived from a careful analysis of the papers published on moral education in *Jiaoyu Yanjiu*. We have illustrated the ways in which regulated individualism grow and become accepted as a legitimate position in constructing the discourse of moral education.

We argue that there are two discourses on moral education, each of which has its own forms of recontextualisation. We have also pointed out that the emergence of regulated individualism is not on the basis of rejecting traditional collectivism. While it is true that more papers written on the basis of regulated individualism means less papers on the basis of traditional collectivism, we have demonstrated that these two ideological positions have their own forms of recontextualisations, which in turn leads to different theories and concepts in moral education.

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